Primera conferencia en el marco de los 20 años del programa de Economía
Legal Rebellion: Constitutional Design in Weakly Institutionalized Societies
Dr. James A. Robinson
University of Chicago
Harris School of Public Policy
Fecha: 24 de febrero 2021
Hora: 9:30 a.m.
Since the days of Hobbes and Locke constitutions are supposed to promote order. The US Constitution followed this design and afterwards Congress stipulated the death penalty for rebellion.
But between 1863 and 1991 Colombian politicians instead chose to normalize, almost legalize, rebellion, viewing it as inevitable. Why? In this project we develop a theory to explain this difference.
Colombians were aware of the US solution, but did not believe it could be implemented in the context they faced. Our theory points to two related reasons which meant that the constitution could not provide order:
1) the biased nature of elections
2) the great uncertainty about how institutions would work in practice (and whether people would obey them). The intuitive reason that rebellion became (almost) legal is that it was a way of compensating for the weak institutions.
Mayores informes: Alexander Villarraga
Director / Profesor-Investigador
Departamento de Economía